## An extract on #consistency

T
{\displaystyle T}
is consistent if and only if there is no formula
{\displaystyle \phi }
such that both
{\displaystyle \phi }
and its negation
{\displaystyle \lnot \phi }
are elements of the set
T
{\displaystyle T}
. Let
A
{\displaystyle A}
be a set of closed sentences (informally "axioms") and
A
{\displaystyle \langle A\rangle }
the set of closed sentences provable from
A
{\displaystyle A}
under some (specified, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system. The set of axioms
A
{\displaystyle A}
is consistent when
A
{\displaystyle \langle A\rangle }
is.
If there exists a deductive system for which these semantic and syntactic definitions are equivalent for any theory formulated in a particular deductive logic, the logic is called complete. The completeness of the sentential calculus was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918 and Emil Post in 1921, while the completeness of predicate calculus was proved by Kurt Gdel in 1930, and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931). Stronger logics, such as second-order logic, are not complete.
A consistency proof is a mathematical proof that a particular theory is consistent. The early development of mathematical proof theory was driven by the desire to provide finitary consistency proofs for all of mathematics as part of Hilbert's program. Hilbert's program was strongly impacted by incompleteness theorems, which showed that sufficiently strong proof theories cannot prove their own consistency (provided that they are in fact consistent).
Although consistency can be proved by means of model theory, it is often done in a purely syntactical way, without any need to reference some model of the logic. The cut-elimination (or equivalently the normalization of the underlying calculus if there is one) implies the consistency of the calculus: since there is obviously no cut-free proof of falsity, there is no contradiction in general.

In theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, there is an intricate relationship between the consistency of the theory and its completeness. A theory is complete if, for every formula in its language, at least one of or is a logical consequence of the theory.
Presburger arithmetic is an axiom system for the natural numbers under addition. It is both consistent and complete.
Gdel's incompleteness theorems show that any sufficiently strong recursively enumerable theory of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. Gdel's theorem applies to the theories of Peano arithmetic (PA) and Primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), but not to Presburger arithmetic.
Moreover, Gdel's second incompleteness theorem shows that the consistency of sufficiently strong recursively enumerable theories of arithmetic can be tested in a particular way. Such a theory is consistent if and only if it does not prove a particular sentence, called the Gdel sentence of the theory, which is a formalized statement of the claim that the theory is indeed consistent. Thus the consistency of a sufficiently strong, recursively enumerable, consistent theory of arithmetic can never be proven in that system itself. The same result is true for recursively enumerable theories that can describe a strong enough fragment of arithmeticincluding set theories such as ZermeloFraenkel set theory. These set theories cannot prove their own Gdel sentenceprovided that they are consistent, which is generally believed.
Because consistency of ZF is not provable in ZF, the weaker notion relative consistency is interesting in set theory (and in other sufficiently expressive axiomatic systems). If T is a theory and A is an additional axiom, T + A is said to be consistent relative to T (or simply that A is consistent with T) if it can be proved that if T is consistent then T + A is consistent. If both A and A are consistent with T, then A is said to be independent of T.